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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
PLEDGES IN WEST VIRGINIA*
The contract of pledge or pawn forms one of the most im-
portant sub-divisions of the general law applicable to bailments.
At an early day the transaction was not known by the term
"pledge", but was rather confined to that of pawning personal
effects and did not embrace the larger phases of modern business.
To-day, the pawnbroker's activity is a very small part of the busi-
ness embraced under the topic of pledges. As the business world
has advanced, larger demands have been made and met along the
line of loans and securities; and from the once small and frequently
discredited business of pawns, a new and important law of se-
curity transactions has developed. Accordingly, one now finds
not only the pawnbroker, but loan and security companies, banks
and trust companies, who hold as pledgee the chattels of corpora-
tions as well as of individuals, so that the relation of pledgor and
pledgee has become an extremely important factor in present day
commercial life.
A recent West Virginia case, Higltand, Executor v. Davis,'
has raised anew many of the most interesting phases of the
law of pledges. P's testator hypothecated stocks of Y company,
along with his note, with the A bank to secure payment of a loan,
the note providing that A might sell the stocks on maturity of the
note, without demand or notice, at public or private sale. Subse-
quently, the executor (P) executed a renewal note on similar
terms with the same stocks as security, and providing in addition,
that the pledgee might become the purchaser of the same. A re-
pledged the notes with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
along with the stocks, (the original note not having been sur-
rendered on execution of the renewal note). D, director in Y
company, bought the renewal note, which had then matured, along
with the collateral from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
and at private sale, sold the latter, no notice having been given or
demand made upon P. P filed a bill to redeem the stocks alleging
that there had been fraud in the sale. The trial chancellor found
* The purpose of this note is to summarize the cases in Virginia until
the formation of the state of West Virginia in 1863, and the subsequent West
Virginia cases, with reference to the fundamental principles of the law of
pledges. The study is primarily for a review of the law in this state and the
Virginia cases are included because they are binding in this jurisdiction. More
recent Virginia cases are included as being persuasive authority.
1W. Va., decided December 7, 1937, not reported, petition for rehearing
pending.
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fraud and granted to P the right to redeem. D appealed. The
court reversed judgment, holding that such a pledge agreement pro-
viding for sale, public or private, without notice with the right of
the pledgee to purchase, was a valid waiver of the pledgor's rights
and that no fraud on the part of D was shown; further, that a
pledgee in making a sale of the pledged property must act in good
faith with reasonable diligence to secure a fair price for the
property and protect the pledgor's interests,- the pledgee acting as
trustee or agent for the pledgor. The case was remanded for the
purpose of ascertaining whether or not the sale price was adequate.
There are fou fundamental points involved in the law of
pledges. They are: (1) Definitions and General Considerations,
(2) Who may Pledge the Subject Matter, (3) Delivery and Pos-
session of the Security, and (4) the Rights and Obligations of the
Parties.
1. Definitions and GeneraZ Considerations. The simplest
definition of a pledge or pawn is that it is a deposit of property
with another as security for the payment of a debt.2 Yet, it is
important to note that the pledge may be broader in scope than
this, i.e., it may be a deposit of goods to secure any obligation.
Thus, in Surber v. Hclintic,3 P deposited goods with D, not to
secure the payment of an existing debt, but to induce D to enter
on his (P's) bond as surety, and to indemnify D in case of any
liability on his part. Generally such a pledge, whether for a debt
or some other purpose, in the absence of an agreement or impli-
cation to the contrary is not subject to any other lien or debt.4
Moreover, it is necessary to note the basic distinctions between
a pledge or pawn, a conditional sale and a mortgage. In the case
of a mortgage, the legal title to the res passes to the mortgagee,
subject to be revested in the mortgagor upon the performance of
an express condition subsequent, whereas in the case of a pledge,
no title passes but merely possession. An exception to this rule
is found in the pledge of a bill of lading, where the title to the
goods represented passes to the transferee, though the transaction
2JoNEs, COLLATE rL SECURi-ES AD PLEDGES (3d ed. 1912) § 1; Bank v.
Harkness, 42 W. Va. 156, 24 S. E. 548 (1896) ; In re Rogers, 20 F. Supp. 120
(1937).
a 10 W. Va. 236 (1877).
&Gilliat v. Lynch, 2 Leigh 493 (Va. 1831); Bank v. Harkness, 42 W. Va.
156, 24 S. E. 548 (1896); Surber v. 1McClintic, 10 W. Va. 236 (1877); Neil
v. Produce Co., 41 W. Va. 37, 23 S. E. 702 (1895).
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is for security purposes only.0 In a conditional sale, the dis-
tinguishing characteristic is a stipulated price for the subject mat-
ter,c the beneficial interest in the chattel going over to the pur-
chaser.
In the case of Downey v. Insurance Company,7 there was an
attempt to pledge corporate bonds, but the pledge transaction had
not been entirely completed, and the court held, that though P
bad intended his action to result in a pledge, the mere intent to
pledge goods in the future was not sufficient to create the relation
and that the transaction had to be entirely consummated. It is a
general rule that all classes of goods and chattels may be pledged,
which includes not only tangible and future goods, but also
debts, choses in action and negotiable instruments.8 There may
even be a pledge of future goods, such as growing crops, creating
an equitable right in the res. However, it is fundamental that
there must be such a delivery as the nature of the goods permits.10
The aid which the pledge transaction gives to the business
and economic world arises chiefly from the fact that the pledge
agreement is a form of security for the creditor and a transfer of
the possession of the property which need not be recorded.11 The
surrender by the pledgee of the collateral security is in and of
itself a sufficient consideration to support a contractual obligation 12
A corporation needing money may pledge its unissued stocks and
bonds with another for the loan of money, such pledge protecting
the lender yet insuring the corporation that the rights of the
pledgee in the securities extend only to the amount of the debt.1
) Neill v. Produce Co., 41 W. Va. 37, 23 S. E. 702 (1895).
a Roberts v. Cocke, 1 Rand. 121 (Va. 1822). See also Leavell v. Robertson,
2 Leigh 161 (Va. 1830) where A deposited stock with B, his surety, with the
stipulation that B was to have the stock if A did not pay the note at maturity.
Hoeld, that such an agreement created a conditional sale.
7 77 W. Va. 386, 87 S. E. 487 (1915).
8 Williams v. Price, 5 Munf. 507 (Va. 1817) ; Woodson v. Woodson, Wythe
129 (Va. 1791); Raynolds v. Carter, 12 Leigh 166 (Va. 1841); Davis v.
Miller, 14 Gratt. I (Va. 1857); Donnally v. Hearndon, 41 W. Va. 519, 23 S.
E. 646 (1895).
o Holroyd v. Marshall, 10 H. L. Cas. 191 (1862). See also W. VA. REV. CODE
(Michie, 1937) c. 38, art. 11, § 18, giving a lien on :future crops where advance-
ments are made on same.
10Bank v. Harkness, 42 W. Va. 156, 24 S. E. 548 (1896).
11Bank v. Harkness, 42 W. Va. 156, 24 S. E. 548 (1896). But see W. VA.
REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 40, art. 1, § 7, requiring recordation of pretended
loan to protect the lender where the pretended borrower has possession for more
than five years or the transaction will be void as to borrower's creditors.
12 Bank v. Lockwood, 13 W. Va. 429 (1878).
13 Kelley v. Wellsburg etc. Co, 74 W. Va. 130, 81 S. E. 782 (1914).
3
B. and W.: Pledges in West Virginia
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1938
STUDENT NOTES
2. Who May Pledge. The owner of goods or one having
authority may pledge, but the pledgee of goods from one without
authority to pledge or sell the property acquires no lien thereon as
against the true owner. Mere possession of a chattel without more,
will not enable the possessor to give good title or make a valid
pledge. The true owner, however, may subsequently validate the
pledge, as where the owner agrees to allow the property to remain
in pledge to secure the debt and the pledgee agrees to forbear col-
lection (consideration for such agreement being the pledgee's for-
bearance).'4
A mere bailee to whom goods aie entrusted, as in the case of
a factor holding goods on consignment,", may not make a valid
pledge of such goods for himself,' 6 nor may an executor pledge
the assets of the estate for his own obligations.17 If the one holding
goods pledges with the intent to convert the proceeds to his own
use, both he and the pledgee are liable in trover whether the
pledgee knew of the real state of the title or not.1 Our code ex-
pressly exempts the pledgee of a chose in action from any liability
on the question of his warranty of the genuineness of such pledged
chose,19 when it is redelivered and payment is received in good
faith.
3. Delivery and Possession. In order that a pledge of per-
sonal property may be effectual it is necessary that possession of
the property be given to the pledgee. Delivery, however, may be
symbolical and the possession according to the nature of the thing,
as where there is a delivery of a document of title which serves to
put the pledgee in possession and is equivalent to an actual de-
livery of the goods. 20 As a general rule, there must be complete
possession in the pledgee,21 but this requirement is satisfied if the
14 Patton v. Jolliffe, 44 W. Va. 88, 28 S. E. 740 (1897).
15 Dodson v. Simpson, 2 Rand. 294 (Va. 1824) ; Skinner v. Dodge, 4 Hen. &
M unf. 432 (Va. 1809).
is Patton v. Jolliffe, 44 W. Va. 88, 28 S. E. 740 (1897). See also Kenneweg
v. Schilansky, 45 W. Va. 521, 31 S. E. 949 (1898); Williams v. Gillespie, 30
W. Va. 586, 5 S. E. 210 (1888).
1f Dodson v. Simpson, 2 Rand. 294 (Va. 1824).
18 Patton v. jolliffe, 44 W. Va. 88, 28 S. E. 740 (1897). See as to criminal
liability of converting bailee W. VA. REv. CODE (Mfichie, 1937) c. 61, art. 3,
§§ 20, 21. Also State v. Cantor, 93 W. Va. 238, 116 S. . 396 (1923).
'19 W. VA. REV. CODE (Mehie, 1937) c. 31, art. 1, § 52.
20 Bank v. Harkness, 42 W. Va. 156, 24 S. E. 548 (1896); Neill v. Produce
Co., 41 W. Va. 37, 23 S. E. 702 (1895).
21 Hamilton Ridge Lumber Sales Co. v. Wilson, 25 Fed. (2d) 592 (C. C. A.
4th, 1928) ; Williams v. Gillespie, 30 W. Va. 586, 5 S. E. 210 (1888) ; Bank v.
Harkness, 42 W. Va. 156, 24 S. E. 548 (1896).
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subject of the pledge is held by a third party for the benefit of
the pledgee, when such person is considered as the pledgee's
agent.2
4. Rights, Duties, and Liabilities of the Parties. The pledgee
of collateral security or other pledge is entitled to hold the same
as against the pledgor, nothwithstanding that the statute of limita-
tions might be successfully pleaded against the debt for the security
of which the pledge was made,23 or that the pledgor has subse-
quently become bankrupt.2 4  Where the property is pledged gener-
ally for the debt, if the pledge be lost or destroyed without fault
of the pledgee, he may still recover the debt from the pledgor;-
otherwise, if there be a special contract that the pledgee shall take
the pledge as the only security for the debt.2" At common law, the
pledgee was not liable for the acts of his assignee, but by statutory
provision" it is now law that the pledgee who repledges or assigns
shall be liable to the owner of the property for the safe keeping
and safe return of such property, and for the conduct of his as-
signee respecting the res.
In the old Virginia case of Hyde v. Nick,2 ' there was a delivery
of a bond to a creditor, (the value of the bond being far in excess
of the amount of the obligation), the agreement providing for re-
turn of the bond to the transferor upon payment within a certain
time. There was a failure to pay within the stipulated time and
upon filing a bill in equity to get the bond back the question arose
whether the transaction was a conditional sale or a pledge. The
rule was laid down that where the consideration is grossly inade-
quate, the transferor may redeem by a bill in equity, thus indi-
cating the policy of the law to construe such a transaction as a
pledge whenever possible. In a controversy where the pledgee is
not in possession, but the res is in the hands of some third person
or junior claimant, equity has jurisdiction to settle the conflicting
rights of the pledgees.2"
22 Bank v. Harkness, 42 W. Va. 156, 24 S. E. 548 (1896); In re Rogers, 20
F. Supp. 120 (1937).
23 Roots v. Mason City Salt Co., 27 W. Va. 483 (1886).
-4 In i- Reogers, 20 F. Supp. 120 (1937).
%5 Raynolds v. Carter, 12 Leigh 166 (Va. 1841).
2a W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) e. 38, art. 11, § 12. See also Bank v.
County Court, 94 W. Va. 733, 120 S. E. 878 (1923).
275 Leigh 336 (Va. 1834).
28Realty Inv. Co. v. Lewis, Hubbard & Co., 86 W. Va. 10, 102 S. E. 702
(1920).
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The pledgee as a general rule, is regarded as a bona fide pur-
chaser and is entitled to the same protection. A pledged chattel
in the hands of the pledgee is not subject to attachment for the
debts of the pledgor. The pledgee of a negotiable note ig con-
sidered as a holder in due course of such instrument20 and is not,
if it is assigned before maturity, subject to any of the defenses
of the original parties,8" but where such equities exist between the
original parties, the pledgee may recover on the security only the
amount of the secured debt.8 1 By the cases, 8 2 a valid pre-existing
debt is prima facie consideration for such transfer of a negotiable
instrument, but it is probable that by statutory provision such pre-
existing debt is per se consideration for the transfer.8 8
The pledgee must use ordinary care to preserve the subject
of the pledge,84 and in case of loss due to theft, the pledgee is bound
to exercise ordinary diligence in taking proper measures for a
recovery of the subject. 5 In an early Virginia case, 0 where A
deposited a slave with B to secure payment of a debt, it was held
that even in the absence of such agreement, B should account for
the profits of the slave after deduction of interest. This seems to
be the rule in most American states, where there is a pledge of an
article yielding a profit.8 ' However, the pledgor of corporate
stock may nevertheless vote it, unless the pledge agreement pro-
vides the contrary.8
The pledge of property to secure a debt is not, in the absence
of an express agreement, to be considered as a general security
for all the debts of the pledgor, such rule having application in
29 Hotldss v. Plaster Co., 41 W. Va. 357, 23 S. E. 576 (1895) ; Bank v.
Nichols, 101 W. Va. 553, 133 S. E. 129 (1926); Bank v. Boggs, 48 W. Va.
289, 37 S. E. 588 (1900) ; Trust Co. v. McClellan, 40 W. Va. 405, 21 S. E. 1025
(1895). See also Prentice v. Zane, 2 Gratt. 262 (Va. 1845); Davis v. Miller,
14 Gratt. 1 (Va. 1857).
so Devendorf v. Oil Co, 17 W. Va. 135 (1880); Hotchkdss v. Plaster Co.,
41 W. Va. 357, 23 S. E. 576 (1895) ; Shepherd v. Anderson, 2 Pat. & H. 203
(Va. 1856); Bank v. Boggs, 48 W. Va. 289, 37 S. E. 588 (1900). See also
Smith v. Lawson, 18 W. Va. 212 (1881).
81 Shepherd v. Anderson, 2 Pat. & H. 203 (Va. 1856).
82 Bank v. Boggs, 48 W. Va. 289, 37 S. E. 588 (1900) distinguishing Trust
Co. v. McClellan, 40 W. Va. 405, 21 S. E. 1025 (1895).
83 W. VA. REv. CoDE (Michie, 1937) c. 46, art. 2, § 2.
a4Reynolds v. Carter, 12 Leigh 166 (Va. 1841).
85 Bank v. County Court, 94 W. Va. 733, 120 S. E. 878 (1923). See also
W. VA. REV. CODE (Miehie, 1937) c. 38, art. 11, § 12.
as Woodson v. Woodson, Wythe 129 (Va. 1791).
87 Stevenson v. Jones, 142 Va. 391, 128 S. E. 568 (1925).
as W. VA. Rzv. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 31, art. 1, § 38.
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the case of Ferrimer v. Lewis, Hubbard & Co.,89 where collateral
was deposited to secure the seller for "certain indebtedness, being
an account for merchandise" purchased. It was there held, that
the pledge applied only to an existing indebtedness, and not to
a running account, and that the words "to be" should not be
read into the agreement before the word "purchased".
Needless to say, the pledgor may sue the pledgee upon a tender
of payment and a demand for delivery, where there is a refusal
to so deliver the res. A curious result was reached in a 1798 Vir-
ginia case, where it was held that if goods were pawned without a
day of redemption being set, the pawnor might redeem at any time
during his life, but that his executors could not, the right being
a personal one. 4 Such a rule is obviously no longer the law. In-
deed, the right of an executor to redeem is assumed without dis-
cussion in the Highland case.
There have been two West Virginia cases treating the sub-
ject of unauthorized handling of the pledged res by the bailee. The
result of one case, Schwartz v. Clark,41 is that where there is a
slight deviation from the authorized mode of dealing with the
pledged res, and the pledgor has ratified such action, he is there-
after bound by it and has no rights as against the pledgee for the
deviation. Recovery was allowed the pledgor, of the stocks
pledged, in Kay v. Piney Coal Co.,42 where the pledgee wrongfully
repledged them and then purchased same at a sale by the second
pledgee, the fraud and bad faith of the original pledgee being the
basis of such recovery.
A large body of the law of pledges, as it exists now, concerns
the remedies and duties of the pledgee in the protection of his
rights and of the pledgor's rights. As against third parties claim-
ing a right to the subject of the pledge, such parties being creditors
of the pledgor, the pledgee may by a bill in equity, restrain inter-
ference with the property by the third parties, the pledgee's lien
having priority.43 Where a non-negotiable note or bond is given
by a debtor to his creditor for an existing debt, it is prima facie
collateral security and does not suspend the right of action on the
so 114 W. Va. 629, 173 S. E. 264 (1934).
40 Chapman v. Turner, 1 Call 280, 1 Am. Dec. 514 (Va. 1798).
41 86 W. Va. 244, 103 S. E. 47 (1920).
42 84 W. Va. 319, 99 S. E. 501 (1919).
43 Lambert v. Huff, 82 W. Va. 362, 95 S. E. 1031 (1918).
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original debt and therefore does not discharge the sureties,44 but
if the creditor takes from his debtor negotiable notes to the amount
of the debt, the law in the absence of an express agreement to the
contrary, presumes an agreemehit to suspend the right to sue on
the bond until the maturity of the notes, thus releasing the
sureties.
43
Where a chose in action is transferred to a creditor as col-
lateral security, it is the right of the creditor to sue upon the chose
in action at law, using the name of the legal owner.4  If there
is a pledge of commercial paper where the pledgee is authorized
to sell the same on maturity of the principal debt, the pledgee is
not limited to his remedy by way of sale, but may sue upon the
pledged chose at maturity.47 In case the pledgor gives the note of
a third party along with his own note to secure payment of the
debt, his note is no bar to recovery on the collateral, and the pledgee
need not surrender or account for the note of the pledgor in his
attempt to collect on the collateral. 4
It is the duty of the creditor to use proper care and diligence
in the management and collection of the collateral, and if by
negligence, wrongful act or omission on his part, loss is sustained,
such loss must be borne by him.4 1 Sureties of the pledgor will be
released to the extent of the damage sustained by the negligence
of the creditor to the same extent as though by a positive act of
such creditor.50 There is no liability, however, for delay in col-
lection unless loss to the pledgor is occasioned,5' and if the pledgor
fails to give the pledgee the help necessary for his collection, the
pledgee will not be liable for damages due to the delay.52
The assignment of a chose in action as collateral security for
a debt, will enable the assignee to recover from the debtor the whole
44 Sayre v. King, 17 W. Va. 562 (1880); Hoge v. Vintroux, 21 W. Va. 1
(1882); Peay v. Morrison's Ex'r, 10 Gratt. 149 (Va. 1853).
45 Armistead v. Ward, 2 Pat. & H. 504 (Va. 1857) ; Sayre v. King, 17 W.
Va. 562 (1880).
48 Whitteker v. Gas Co., 16 W. Va. 717 (1880); Bank v. Kimberlands, 16 W.
Va. 555 (1880); Lazier v. Nevin, 3 W. Va. 622 (1869); Davis v. Millor, 14
Gratt. I (Va. 1857).
47 Bank v. Parsons, 90 W. Va. 51, 110 S. E. 491 (1922).
48 Lazier v. Nevin, 3 W. Va. 622 (1869).
49 Bank v. Kimberlands, 16 W. Va. 555 (1880) ; Bank v. Kittle, 69 W. Va.
171, 71 S. E. 109 (1911); Rumsey v. Laidley, 34 W. Va. 721, 12 S. E. 866
(1891); Whitteker v. Gas Co., 16 W. Va. 717 (1880).
50 Bank v. Kittle, 69 W. Va. 171, 71 S. E. 109 (1911).
51 Gibson v. Aglionby, 87 W. Va. 86, 104 S. E. 612 (1920) ; Bank v. Harris,
96 W. Va. 419, 123 S. R. 254 (1924).
52 Gibson v. Aglionby, 87 W. Va. 86, 104 S. E. 612 (1920).
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liability, the assignee holding the excess in trust for the assignor, 3
subject to the exception discussed above where equities exist be-
tween the maker and the payee assignor. It was held in an early
West Virginia decision,54 that in the absence of an express agree-
ment" providing for a sale of commercial paper pledged, the
pledgee could not sell the same nor could he resort to a court of
equity. Such is hardly the law to-day. In any event, the 1931
code, " ' by providing for a sale of the pledged subject upon reason-
able notice and demand, no doubt covers this situation. 7  Where
there is a pledge of perishable goods, the lienor or pledgee may
sell such goods after reasonable notice and demand on the pledgor,
depending upon the circumstances and the nature of the goods
pledged.' 8
West Virginia has gone far in enforcing drastic pledge agree-
ments as indicated by the Neuhardt cases."9 Although such agree-
ments are said by a noted commentator to "fall into the prohibited
class of agreements for a forfeiture," indicating further, that this
class of agreements are or should be void as against public policy,60
recent cases, both in West Virginia and other jurisdictions
seem to indicate that the parties under a pledge agreement may
waive any rights except the right against an express forfeiture.6'
A study of this nature necessarily develops small inconsis-
tencies in the law; but careful analysis discloses that West Virginia
cases have been kept from obvious conflict by various statutory pro-
visions and by careful regard for previous decisions. Perhaps
53 Bentley v. Ins. Co., 40 W. Va. 729, 23 S. E. 584 (1895). See also Shepherd
v. Anderson, 2 Pat. & H. 203 (Va. 1856) holding that the pledgee may recover
only the amount of his debt where the pledgor could not recover against the
maker of the note.
54 Whitteker v. Gas Co., 16 W. Va. 717 (1880).
55 Miller v. Bank, 85 W. Va. 82, 100 S. E. 864 (1919) where a sale was
authorized by the pledge agreement.
5 W. VA. REv. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 38, art. 11, § 14.
57 See also Crawford v. Lefevre, 78 W. Va. 73, 88 S. E. 1087 (1916).
58 W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 38, art. 11, § 15 providing for the sale
of perishable goods upon reasonable notice and demand. See also Williams v.
Price, 5 Munf. 507 (Va. 1817).
69 Berry v. Neuhardt, 117 W. Va. 67, 183 S. E. 858 (1936) ; Bank of New
Martinsville v. Neuhardt, 117 W. Va. 70, 183 S. E. 859 (1936); Fisher v.
Neuhardt, 117 W. Va. 80, 183 S. E. 861 (1936), all holding that a pledge agree-
ment providing for a sale of the res without notice or demand was valid.
60 Seasongood, Drastic Pledge Agreements (1916) 29 HARv. L. REV. 277.
61 Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 206 U. S. 28, 27 S. Ct. 681 (1907); Empire Nat.
Bank v. Oil Ref. Co., 260 Pa. 255, 103 Atl. 602 (1918) ; Whitman v. Refrigera-
tion Co., 233 Mass. 386, 124 N. E. 43 (1919); Wilkes v. Fruit & Produce Co.,
233 Mich. 215, 206 N. W. 483 (1925).
9
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Bank v. Harkness2 contains the most comprehensive treatment of
the subject to date, having often been cited by text-writers. Other
West Virginia case-law is in accord with the weight of American
authority and is by no means an unimportant part of the common
law discussion of the subject of pledges.
A. L. B.
W. G. W.
82 42W . Va. 156, 24 S. E. 548 (1896).
10
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